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Abstract
Democratic principles demand that every voter should be able to individually verify that their vote is recorded as
intended and counted as recorded, without having to trust any authorities. However, most end-to-end (E2E) verifiable
voting protocols that provide universal verifiability and voter secrecy implicitly require to trust some authorities or auditors
for the correctness guarantees that they provide.
In this paper, we explore the notion of individual verifiability. We evaluate the existing E2E voting protocols and
propose a new protocol that guarantees such verifiability without any trust requirements. Our construction depends on a
novel vote commitment scheme to capture voter intent that allows voters to obtain a direct zero-knowledge proof of their
vote being recorded as intended. We also ensure protection against spurious vote injection or deletion post eligibility
verification, and polling-booth level community profiling.
1 Introduction
India concluded the world’s largest parliamentary election in 2019 [Wu and Gettleman, 2019] with 543 constituencies
and well over 1 million voters per constituency on the average. Complete polling with offline electronic voting machines
(EVM) not only ensured efficiency of the polling process and timely announcement of results, but, from several accounts,
also ensured that the election was fair [ET-Bureau, 2019, Purkayastha and Sinha, 2019]. Electronic voting perhaps is
essential for managing elections of such size and complexity. However, the EVM solution [Election Commission of India,
2019a,b] was not verifiable and had inadequate guarantees [Shukla, 2018, Banerjee and Sharma, 2019], which inevitably
generated disquiet during the elections [Vora, 2017, Venkataramakrishnan, 2019].
World-wide concerns with EVMs have resulted in their being discontinued in many countries. After several years of
controversy, Netherlands abandoned electronic voting in 2007 [Goldsmith and Ruthrauff, 2007], deciding that the integrity
of the democratic process was more important than efficiency. Similar considerations have led to their discontinuation
in Germany [NDI, 2019], France [Reuters, 2017], Ireland [O’Halloran and O’Regan, 2010] and several others. Many in
the USA have voiced their apprehensions [Mercuri, 2007, Schneier, 2018, Schwartz, 2018] against existing EVMs, and
the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) has decided to design and build a secure open source voting
system for the future [Zetter, 2019].
Internet voting makes electronic voting more complex. Though countries like Estonia and Switzerland have exper-
imented with internet voting, the concerns with them are many [Rivest, 2001a, Tufekci, 2019]. In a recent report, the
national academies in the USA have recommended against internet voting till robust guarantees can be worked out, and
have suggested conducting elections with human readable paper ballots [National Academies of Sciences, Engineering
and Medicine, 2018].
In this paper, we first identify the concerns that surround electronic voting and then design an offline direct-recording
electronic (DRE) protocol suitable for large elections such as in India. Not only does our protocol address the correctness
and secrecy concerns and significantly improves upon the state-of-the-art, but we also factor in the cultural considerations
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that make some commonly used techniques unsuitable for the Indian context. We provide formal proofs of the key
characteristics of our protocol.
1.1 Design objectives
The end-to-end (E2E) verifiable voting protocols do not rely only on EVMs but try to provide provable guarantees that
votes are recorded and tallied correctly [Chaum, 2004, Chaum et al., 2008, Dzieduszycka-Suinat et al., 2015]. They can
either be based on optical scanning of paper ballots, or DRE. In what follows we outline the design requirements.
1.1.1 Trust requirement for correctness
Democratic principles demand that it should not be necessary to trust any authorities, individually or collectively, for
the correctness of the election process. Moreover, every component of the election process should be publicly auditable
without requiring trust on any special auditors or experts.
Eligibility verification is outside the scope of this paper, hence trust on the polling officers for identity verification and
eligibility checks is unavoidable. However, this trust must be publicly recorded, and we require the polling officers to
certify each valid vote.
1.1.2 Trust requirement for voter secrecy
In any polling system voter secrecy must be preserved at all times. Hence, voting systems must never issue a receipt
for the cast vote to a voter to ensure that a voter is never able to prove to a coercer or a potential vote buyer who they
voted for [Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994]. Secrecy and receipt-freeness are necessary conditions for coercion-free voting.
Receipt-freeness however does not prevent from issuing a token receipt to a voter from which no information about who
they voted for can be gleaned.
All electronic voting systems need to trust the hardware security and privacy implementations - for example using
trusted execution environments [Sabt et al., 2015] - and also the custody chain of authorities for not compromising voter
secrecy. The protocol itself must guarantee not to leak information.
1.1.3 Correctness guarantees
The overall correctness of voting is established by the correctness of three steps: cast-as-intended indicating that the
voting machine has registered the vote correctly, recorded-as-cast indicating the cast vote is correctly included in the final
tally, and counted-as recorded indicating that final tally is correctly computed. Recorded-as-intended is a composition of
the first two.
1.1.4 Universal verifiability
A voting system is universally verifiable if it can provide provable recorded-as-cast and counted-as-recorded guarantees
for every vote, either deterministically or with a high probability. Universal verifiability implies that a system is auditable.
1.1.5 Individual verifiability
Individually verifiable usually implies [Cortier and Lallemand, 2018, Castello´, 2016] that every voter can verify that their
vote is cast-as-intended and is recorded in the final list to be counted. It turns out that individual verifiability is essential
for voter secrecy [Cortier and Lallemand, 2018].
We extend the traditional definition of individual verifiability to further include that voters can proactively seek sound
and complete proofs that their votes are also recorded-as-intended and counted-as-recorded. The proof of individual
verifiability should be available on demand, and if it depends on a global universally verifiable component, then that
component should be publicly auditable without requiring any special auditors. Every voter should be able to trace their
vote to the tally for their chosen candidate and verify the tally. Also, universal verifiability invoking global properties of
the election process does not imply individual verifiability, and the notion of verifiability that we seek is stricter than what
is usually described in the literature [Bernhard et al., 2017, Castello´, 2016].
It is crucial for democracy that not only are elections fair, but that they also appear to be fair and do not depend
on certification by experts and auditors. Such individual verifiability is at the very root of voter confidence in electoral
democracy.
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1.1.6 Dispute resolution
Effective dispute resolution requires a process for clear determination in favour of either the voter or the election authority
in case of a challenge, without compromising voter secrecy. Individual verifiability is necessary to establish that every
cast vote is non-repudiable, i.e., a voter cannot later claim that their vote was not recorded or counted correctly. Non-
repudiability of a cast vote cannot be established without the election authority being able to provide a sound proof of
recorded-as-intended, or compromising on voter secrecy. Universal verifiability - unless established through publicly
auditable processes - does not imply non-repudiability.
Dispute resolution also requires non-repudiability of the verification receipts issued to voters by the election and
polling authorities. This, in turn, requires all receipts to be duly signed.
1.1.7 Software independence
A voting system is software-independent if an undetected change or error in its software cannot cause an undetectable
change or error in an election outcome [Rivest, 2008]. Software independence is a necessary condition for universal
verifiability, because hardware-software verifiability of a system such as an EVM is almost surely an intractable (at least
NP-Hard) problem [Mercuri, 1992]. Thus, the correctness of an E2E verifiable system should not depend on the hardware
or software used, and must be established solely from the computed output at various stages. Software-independent
systems only rely on the computing platforms to preserve secrecy by not leaking information.
Any EVM based solution that relies on hardware and software integrity, with or without voter-verified paper audit trails
(VVPAT) [Mercuri, 1992, Election Commission of India, 2019a], is not software independent and is hence not universally
verifiable. Besides, VVPAT only ensures that the electronic vote count matches that of the paper audit trail, and that
by itself provides no guarantee against spurious vote injection or deletion in both. Reliance on ad hoc and unverifiable
processes such as in [Election Commission of India, 2019a, Purkayastha and Sinha, 2019] can only result in uncertain
technological solutions for electoral democracy.
1.1.8 Protection against spurious vote injection
A voting system must also be free of spurious vote injection, at all times before, during or after polling. There must be
guarantee that no votes are recorded and tallied other than those approved and certified by the polling officer. Traditionally,
universal verifiability does not guarantee against spurious vote injection.
1.1.9 Bare-handed voting
It has also been advocated that a voter should have zero digital computing available at voting time [Chaum, 2004]. The
reasons for bare-handed voting are threefold. First, it is unfair to rely on voters to be able to compute cryptographic
functions - or even digitally sign - when they may not have the agency or necessary understanding of the process. Second, it
is unreasonable to assume that voters can have access to trusted computing platforms that will not leak information [Rivest,
2001a, Adida, 2006]. For example, commodity laptops and handhelds, which a voter may own but not have complete
understanding of, certainly cannot be trusted either for correctness of cryptographic computations or for privacy of voting.
The secure platform problem [Rivest, 2001b] effectively rules out internet voting [Chaum, 2004, Rivest, 2001a,b, Mercuri,
2007], and bare-handed voting systems must necessarily be polling booth protocols. Finally, if voters are not bare-handed,
it is impossible to prevent willing voters from leaking information that could be used to prove how they voted. Therefore,
all voters must be bare handed.
1.1.10 Large aggregation
Finally, making the vote tally of an EVM or a polling booth - typically of a few thousand voters - public may enable
profiling of a locality or a community. Hence, it is essential to aggregate the votes over several polling booths and EVMs
leading upto perhaps even an entire constituency before making the tally public. Large aggregations are essential for
community privacy, and is challenging because this necessitates hiding the polling officers’ identities, yet requiring the
polling officers to certify each recorded vote.
1.2 Existing E2E protocols and their limitations
In this section, we review some E2E voting techniques and protocols with respect to the design objectives outlined above.
Table 1 summarises the discussion.
3
Protocol Frontend Backend
Individual verifiability of
recorded-as-intended4 Protection against
spurious vote injection5
Trust on authorities
for correctness6Cast-as-intended Recorded-as-cast
Preˆt a` voter [Ryan
et al., 2009] Cast-or-audit Mixnets Yes (see Sec. 1.2.1) No
1 No
Yes, on authorities for
keeping ballots secret
and on mixnet auditors
Scantegrity I
[Chaum et al., 2008],
Scantegrity II
[Chaum et al., 2009]
Cast-or-audit Mixnet-like Yes (see Sec. 1.2.1) No1 No Yes, on mixnet auditors
Scratch & Vote
[Adida and Rivest,
2006]
Cast-or-audit Homomorphictallying Yes (see Sec. 1.2.1) Yes (see Sec. 1.2.4) No No
STAR-vote [Bell
et al., 2013] Cast-or-audit
Homomorphic
tallying
No, selective
targeting possible2 Yes (see Sec. 1.2.4) No
Yes, on EVM
controllers to not
selectively target voters
Markpledge [Adida
and Neff, 2009] Interactive ZKP Mixnets Yes (see Sec. 1.2.2) No
1 No Yes, on mixnet auditors
Bingo voting [Bohli
et al., 2007]
Trusted RNG +
Interactive ZKP
NIZK +
Mixnet-like Yes (see Sec. 1.2.2) No
1 Yes
Yes, on polling booth
RNG and mixnet
auditors
Scantegrity III
[Sherman et al.,
2011]
Verifiably random
choice b/w two
receipt types
Individual
verification
using obtained
receipt type
Depends on
auditability of
random choice
mechanism3
Depends on
auditability of
random choice
mechanism3
No Yes, on random choicemechanism
Our protocol
Vote commitment
with obfuscation
token
ZKP of set
membership Yes Yes Yes No
1 Decryption of votes using mixnet or mixnet-like systems requires special auditors and is not individually verifiable. See Section 1.2.3.
2 This is a DRE protocol where voters directly cast their votes on a voting machine and encryptions of their votes are generated electronically. Thus anyone who controls the
voting machine could selectively manipulate the votes of voters whose voting intent or tendency to challenge can be guessed. See Section 1.2.1.
3 In this protocol, two receipt types can be generated where each receipt gives only a 50% guarantee of recorded-as-intended but the choice of the type of receipt to generate is
“verifiably random”. Making the random choice mechanism verifiable for all voters may turn out to be impractical.
4 Effective dispute resolution requires “Yes” in both sub-columns. See Section 1.1.6. Counted-as-recorded is publicly verifiable in most protocols.
5 See Section 1.2.5.
6 All protocols place trust on authorities or hardware/software implementations for secrecy. See Section 1.1.2.
Table 1: Comparison of some end-to-end verifiable voting protocols.
1.2.1 Cast-or-audit challenge at the frontend
The most common method for capturing voter intent, e.g., in Preˆt a` voter [Ryan et al., 2009], Scratch & Vote [Adida and
Rivest, 2006], STAR-vote [Bell et al., 2013] and Scantegrity I and II [Chaum et al., 2008, Chaum et al., 2009], is to use
some form of a cast-or-audit challenge [Benaloh, 2006, 2008], wherein voters may optionally choose to challenge one
or more of the issued ballots by demanding that the encryption be revealed, and use a new one for actually casting the
vote. Sufficient number of such challenges by different voters and auditors provide global probabilistic guarantees against
malformed ballots.
While cast-or-audit gives agency to the voters and is a step towards individual verifiability, this option alone is insuffi-
cient to provide a sound recorded-as-intended proof for each vote. Since the actually cast ballot can never be completely
decrypted to ensure voter secrecy, the challenge by itself does not provide a way for a voter to actually verify that the
finally cast vote is indeed recorded in favour of the intended candidate in the tally.
Also, the guarantee to an individual voter is not even probabilistic because voters who are unlikely to challenge the
ballot encryption can potentially be targeted selectively with malformed ballots, if it can be guessed how they are likely to
vote. Just a challenge-based mechanism is particularly problematic for countries and societies where the cultural capital
necessary to challenge authorities may be lacking. Protocols where ballots or encryptions are generated interactively on
the spot [Bell et al., 2013] are particularly vulnerable to such attacks, especially if hardware devices can be compromised
and controlled. The risk is somewhat mitigated in protocols where the ballots are pre-printed and randomly distributed,
but they are still vulnerable if it can be guessed how voters in a booth are likely to vote as a community, and that they are
unlikely to challenge. The risk of selective targeting is minimised if the ballots are self contained and cryptographically
committed, and can be publicly audited for correctness by anybody, including voters and candidates, such as in [Adida
and Rivest, 2006, Chaum et al., 2008, Chaum et al., 2009].
1.2.2 Protocols with direct cast-as-intended proofs
Markpledge [Adida and Neff, 2009] and Bingo voting [Bohli et al., 2007] provide sound cast-as-intended guarantees.
Markpledge achieves this through an individually verifiable interactive zero-knowledge proof [Goldwasser et al., 1985]
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where voters send their own random challenge to the voting machine. However, Bingo voting has to rely on the availability
of a trusted random number generator (RNG) in the polling booth. Both protocols need to depend on an auditable mixnet
(Section 1.2.3) for the recorded-as-cast guarantee in the final decrypted tally.
1.2.3 Auditable mixnets at the backend
The most common method for providing a proof to a voter of inclusion of the cast ballot in the tally, while preserving
voter secrecy, is to use a mixnet [Chaum, 1981]. A mixnet is a series of mix-servers that receive voters’ encrypted votes,
shuffle them and send decrypted votes to the destination; thus anonymising the link between the voters’ encrypted and
decrypted votes. Several popular voting protocols - including Preˆt a` voter [Ryan et al., 2009], Scantegrity I and II [Chaum
et al., 2008, Chaum et al., 2009], Bingo voting [Bohli et al., 2007], Markpledge [Adida and Neff, 2009] - use mixnets at
the backend. Individual voters can only trace their encrypted receipts upto a bulletin board at the input of the mixnet. To
establish the correctness of decryptions, a trusted auditor randomly verifies parts of the mixnet without ever exposing the
full path from an encrypted vote to the corresponding decrypted vote. Consequently, there is only universal probabilistic
guarantee of the correctness of the decryption and there is no individual verifiability and non-repudiability.
Note that individuals cannot be directly allowed to open mixnets, as that would run the risk of multiple colluding
coercers opening the complete path from the encrypted vote to the decrypted vote for a given voter. Hence trust on
special auditors is unavoidable. Even with random opening of the mixnet with a verifiable random number generator, the
accessibility for electronic public audit is questionable.
1.2.4 Homomorphic tallying at the backend
Protocols like Scratch & Vote [Adida and Rivest, 2006] and STAR-vote [Bell et al., 2013] rely on homomorphic tallying
of encrypted votes in the ciphertext space, which can be publicly verified, without ever decrypting them. The final
encrypted tally is decrypted by a set of trustees, but a publicly verifiable zero-knowledge proof [Goldwasser et al., 1985]
of correctness of the decryption can be provided. Thus, these methods satisfy individual verifiability of recorded-as-cast
and counted-as-recorded.
1.2.5 Spurious vote injection
Effective protection against spurious vote injections requires the polling officers to certify every cast vote as eligible and
as per protocol in a publicly verifiable way. Most of the above protocols do not explicitly do this (see Table 1). Some
protocols, e.g. [Chaum et al., 2009], keep a count of issued, cast and spoilt ballots to prevent against ballot stuffing, but
this requires unaccounted trust on poll workers. Requiring a publicly verifiable signed certificate against every recorded
vote in the tally - certifying both eligibility verification and adherence to the polling protocol - poses some challenges.
This requires the polling officers to affix their signature only after a vote is cast and yet preserve voter secrecy, and the
certificate to be publicly verifiable and yet prevent the polling booth from being identified for large aggregations.
1.2.6 Dispute resolution
Most of the above protocols cannot provide sound recorded-as-intended proofs to individual voters without any trust
assumptions. Consequently, dispute resolution is problematic in them. In addition, dispute resolution in ballot-based
protocols that do not account for unused ballots in a verifiable way is unsound because malicious voters can produce fake
votes marked on unused ballots to challenge the election.
1.2.7 Uniqueness of ballots
A necessary condition for overall correctness is that each voter gets a unique ballot, otherwise votes of multiple voters
voting for the same candidate can possibly be collapsed and counted as one vote. This however is a global property and
is only universally verifiable. Protocols with pre-printed and randomly distributed ballots are naturally resilient to ballot
replay attacks, because at ballot printing time it cannot be determined if voters using them would vote identically or not.
Some protocols assume that each voter holds a unique identity [Adida and Rivest, 2006], or depend on a trusted random
number generator [Bohli et al., 2007] or timestamp [Bell et al., 2013] for uniqueness.
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1.3 Our contributions
In contrast to the existing protocols, our E2E voting protocol provides provable guarantees for all the properties specified
in Section 1.1. Specifically,
1. It is universally and individually verifiable, as per our extended definition. It is also software-independent and
bare-handed. It provides sound E2E guarantees to every individual voter that their vote is recorded-as-intended and
counted-as-recorded.
2. Our protocol uses random distribution of pre-printed ballots with an optional cast-or-audit component. In addition,
it provides universal verifiability against malformed ballots.
3. It provides universally verifiable guarantees against vote injection at all stages post eligibility verification.
4. Both the above universally verifiable components in our protocol are publicly auditable and they do not require any
special auditors. There is no trust assumption on any authority.
5. It is a DRE protocol making it very similar to and suitable for large elections such as in India [Election Commission
of India, 2019b]. The protocol optionally supports voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPAT).
6. It relies on the EVMs and other storage elements to preserve secrecy by not leaking information. The protocol itself
completely guarantees secrecy, including large aggregations to prevent against community profiling.
7. We provide formal proofs of correctness and secrecy of the protocol. The correctness arguments hold even if the
authorities collude with each other.
2 An overview of our protocol
Our voting protocol involves two authorities - one polling officer for every polling booth in a constituency, whose respon-
sibility is to ensure that the polling protocol is correctly followed, and an election authority, whose responsibility is to
collect the voting records from the EVMs after verification and finally store the records and tally the votes. The election
authority is also responsible for providing proofs that all votes have been accounted for correctly in the tally. Individual
and universal verifiability are guaranteed even if the polling officer colludes with the election authority. For secrecy, we
rely on the authorities and the hardware and software used to not leak information.
We use some key concepts from cryptography, which we explain below along with the protocol overview.
The first concept is that of a digital signature [Diffie and Hellman, 1976] which provides a unique binding of the
identity of the signer to a message and confirms the integrity of the message. A digital signature is non-repudiable and
the signature and the integrity of the message can be publicly verified by anybody using the public key of the signer. An
anonymous group based digital signature [Chaum and van Heyst, 1991] makes the identity of a signer indistinguishable
in a group of authorised signers. The collections of polling officers and EVMs in a constituency form two groups of
anonymous signers [Chaum and van Heyst, 1991]. A blind signature [Chaum, 1983] allows one to obtain a signature on a
message without exposing the contents of the message to the signer. In our context, it enables a polling officer to certify
that a vote has been cast correctly preserving voter secrecy. We use a scheme of group blind signatures.
The second crucial concept that we rely upon is that of a cryptographic commitment [Pedersen, 1992]. A commitment
of a chosen value implies that the committer can no longer alter their choice, but this does not require them to reveal their
choice in any way. A useful metaphor is to put the choice in a box, lock the box and hand over the box to an adversary or
a third party but retain the key. The committer cannot go back on the choice because others have digital copies of the box,
but the privacy of their choice is preserved completely because nobody else can open the box or its copies. At a later time
the committer may open the box and reveal their choice.
Before polling starts, the election authority prepares a set of tokens each containing a random identity and an obfusca-
tion key, along with their corresponding cryptographic commitments digitally signed by the election authority. The printed
tokens are securely transported to a box in the polling booth, and can be audited anytime before and during polling. The
tokens can also be audited by the candidates or their representatives independent of the polling officer.
When a voter arrives at the polling booth the polling officer carries out an identity and eligibility verification - possibly
offline - before allowing the voter to vote (Figure 1a). The voter picks up a random token from the box of tokens and
proceeds for voting (Figure 1b). At the EVM, the voter first casts their vote and obtains a commitment on the vote (Figure
1c), and then feeds the randomly picked token to the EVM (Figure 1d) for the purpose of obtaining a verifiable receipt
(Figure 1e).
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(a) Identity verification. (b) Voter picks from the box a random token containing a
random id, an obfuscation key u′, and the encoded commit-
ments. Tokens in the box can be subjected to public audit by
any concerned party.
(c) Voter presses the button corresponding to vote v.
EVM prints a commitment for the vote.
(d) Voter presents the token obtained from PO to the
EVM for scanning. Secrets in the token are shredded
and the rest of the token is returned to the voter.
(e) EVM prints a receipt with the computed value
u′ + v mod m. The voter verifies, either mentally or
using a table look-up, and presses OK if the sum is
correct. EVM then signs the receipt.
Figure 1: Voter experience at the polling booth
Figure 2: After polling is over voters verify their receipts, either themselves or through a representative who can obtain a
zero knowledge proof from the election authority.
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We cannot directly obtain a commitment of the vote from the voter because we have assumed that voters cannot
digitally compute. So, we follow a protocol to obtain a confirmation from the voter on their vote in complete secrecy. The
key idea is to convert the confirmation to a cryptographic commitment indicating that the vote has been recorded correctly.
The EVM prints out a modular sum of the vote and the obfuscation key (Figure 1e). The voter confirms that the sum is
correct, and this according to the protocol implies that the commitment of the vote is correct. Our protocol amplifies the
confirmation of a small addition by the voter into a provably correct cryptographic commitment.
The EVM signs the receipt only after recording the voter’s confirmation. The confirmation also independently reaches
the polling officer, who records that the protocol is complete. This is done using a blind signature scheme so that voter
secrecy is protected from the polling officer too. The part of the token containing the obfuscation key and the random
identity is destroyed, and the remaining part containing only the commitments are returned to the voter as a receipt, along
with a commitment of the vote. Note that issuing the commitment receipt to the voter does not violate the receipt-free
condition, because it is impossible to determine the vote from the commitment alone. The polling officer physically signs
and stamps all voter receipts to make them official.
After voting ends, the polling officers upload the records from each EVM in a constituency, which are piped through a
shuffler. We do not require any cryptographic guarantees of the shuffling process, and a simple random permutation would
do. All private data pass encrypted through this stage. The output of the shuffler is passed on to the election authority who
decrypts and stores the private information securely, and displays the votes along with the random identifiers - for which
a cryptographic commitment has been issued during voting - publicly on a bulletin board [Heather and Lundin, 2009] in
human-readable form. Anybody can verify the tally from the bulletin board, which allows downloading of the data and
verification of a hash signature. The aggregation, anonymous group signatures and permutation at the shuffler remove
all traceability of the records to particular EVMs giving perfect anonymisation. Thus the records arrive at the election
authority through an anonymous channel.
The final cryptographic construct is a zero knowledge proof that the previously issued commitments correspond to one
of the publicly displayed items on the bulletin board, without revealing any information about which [Camenisch et al.,
2008]. A zero knowledge proof (ZKP) of a statement is an interactive protocol between a prover and a verifier where the
prover convinces the verifier of the validity of the statement without revealing any additional information [Goldwasser
et al., 1985]. For individual verifiability, a voter - perhaps through a representative - can use the commitments issued
to them during voting to obtain a ZKP that the entry corresponding to their commitment is indeed on the bulletin board
(Figure 2). The prover can be a secure online service of the election authority to which only a set of commitments can be
uploaded for verification. The representative can be anybody who can execute the protocol online.
3 Cryptography basics
Throughout this paper p and q denote large primes such that q divides p − 1, Gq is a unique cyclic subgroup of Z∗p of
order q, and g and h are generators of Gq . There exist standard and efficient procedures to generate such prime pairs, and
Gq = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉. We assume that g and h are system initialized once before the election commences and are publicly
known, but the discrete logarithm logg h is not known to anybody and is hard to compute.
3.1 Pedersen commitment
Given a message ρ ∈ Zq we use the Pedersen commitment scheme [Pedersen, 1992], C = gρhr, where r ∈ Zq is a secret
randomness, to compute a value C that hides ρ.
Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding because C gives no information about ρ. The binding property, which
demands that given a commitment C, it is hard to compute a different pair of message and randomness (ρ′, r′) with the
same commitment, is derived from the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem, because distinct openings (ρ, r) and
(ρ′, r′) of a given commitment gρhr = gρ
′
hr
′
reveal that logg(h) = (ρ− ρ′)/(r′ − r) mod q.
Moreover, Pedersen commitment is additively homomorphic, i.e., if C1 = gρ1hr1 and C2 = gρ2hr2 are commitments
of ρ1 and ρ2 respectively, then C1 ∗ C2 = gρ1+ρ2hr1+r2 is a commitment of ρ1 + ρ2.
3.2 ZKP of set membership: C is a commitment of some ρi ∈ Φ
We use the scheme proposed by [Camenisch et al., 2008] to provide a zero knowledge proof that a given commitment C
corresponds to a message ρ ∈ Φ where Φ is a publicly available set without revealing the message. If Φ is stored indexed
by C, then the ZKP of set membership is computationally efficient and requires only O(1) sized proofs [Camenisch et al.,
2008]. See supplementary Section B for a description of the procedure and the associated security properties.
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1. Pre-generation of tokens for polling booth k:
(a) POk: Generate an ElGamal private key xk ∈ Zq and the corresponding public key gxk . Send gxk to the
election authority.
(b) EA: For each token i ∈ [0, N∗] (where N∗ is sufficiently large, say, a small multiple of the total size of
the electorate):
i. Generate a random identifier ridi (uniformly random from Zq) and its Pedersen commitment [Peder-
sen, 1992] Cridi = g
ridihrIi where rIi ∈ Zq is a secret randomness (Section 3.1).
ii. Generate a random integer ui ∈ Zq (an obfuscation key) and a Pedersen commitment Cui = guihrui
where rui ∈ Zq is a secret randomness.
iii. Generate a blinded random identifier bridi = blind(ridi, bi, pik), blinded for the ephemeral public
key for this token pik = (gxk)rpik , where rpik is uniformly random in Zq , using bi as the blinding
factor for blinding ridi.
iv. Sign the commitments as λtokeni = signEA(Cridi , Cui).
v. Print out a token containing three separable components: first, the signed commitments
(Cridi , Cui , λtokeni), second, the random secrets (rIi , rui , ridi, ui, u
′
i = ui mod m, bridi, bi, pik),
and third, a chit containing (rpik , bridi). Only u
′
i needs to be printed in human-readable form; other
information needs to be printed in QR codes.
2. Publish all the ephemeral public keys for all polling booths to a bulletin board BB0 in random order.
3. Securely distribute the generated tokens to a box Bk kept in polling booth k.
4. Any auditors, including the candidates or their representatives, can draw random tokens from Bk at any time
and audit the correctness of the commitments. Voters can also take home random tokens from Bk for audit. No
audited tokens can be used for voting.
We drop k from the indices of ridi, ui because they are drawn randomly from very large sets with negligible proba-
bilities of collisions.
Figure 3: Token pre-generation and distribution.
4 The protocol
We assume that a vote is an element from the set {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} where m is a small integer.
Each polling booth, k, has two machines, POk and EVMk. The EVMk is unmanned and standalone, but POk is
controlled by the polling officer (PO) of the booth. Messages signed by the election authority, polling officer and the
EVM are denoted by λ, σ and µ respectively. signpk identifies the anonymous digital signature of the polling officer, and
signek identifies the anonymous digital signature of EVMk. We assume that the polling officer and EVM signatures are
anonymous over the group [Chaum and van Heyst, 1991] indexed by k.
Polling officer’s acknowledgments are anonymously signed using Scheme 1 of Chaum and van Heyst [1991] that is
compatible with a blind signature scheme based on ElGamal signatures Mohammed et al. [2000]. Under this scheme,
bsignpik denotes the blind signature of the polling officer at polling booth k using the secret key corresponding to token i.
The operations corresponding to blinding and unblinding are blind and unblind.
The protocol consists of the following stages:
Pre-polling steps: See Figure 3. The tokens are generated and pre-printed by the Election Authority (EA) in a secure
way. The tokens are self-contained [Adida and Rivest, 2006] and the correctness of the commitments in each
token can be verified by anybody independent of the EA. The three parts of the token contain the random id, the
obfuscation keys and the secrets; the commitments; and the blinded random id for the polling officer to sign using
a group signature scheme. Only the operative part of the obfuscation key (u′i) needs to be in human-readable form.
At the polling booth: The steps for each voter Vi at the polling booth k comprise two stages - first at the polling officer’s
desk (Figure 4) and then at the EVM (Figure 5). The tokens are randomly chosen by the voters (Figures 3 and 4) to
avoid any possible targeted attacks. The voter hands over only the part of the token containing the blinded random
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1. Polling officer (using POk): Verifies the identity of the voter Vi (may be non-digitally).
2. Vi: Select a random token from box Bk. Polling officer verifies that the token is freshly drawn from box Bk.
3. Vi → POk: Tear the chit part of the token containing (rpik , bridi) and give it to the polling officer for scanning.
Polling officer should not see the rest of the token.
4. Vi proceeds to the booth of EVMk with the rest of the token.
Figure 4: The steps for voter Vi at the polling officer’s desk
1. Vi→ EVMk (button press): vi (vote).
2. EVMk → Vi: Print out Cvi = gvihrvi , where rvi ∈ Zq is a secret randomness.
3. Vi → EVMk: The token containing signed commitments (Cridi , Cui , λtokeni) and random secrets
(rIi , rui , ridi, ui, ui mod m, bridi, bi, pik) for scanning. After scanning, the part of the token containing the
random secrets is destroyed (shredded) and the part containing the signed commitments is returned to the voter.
EVMk checks all commitments and the signature.
4. EVMk: Sets wi = ui + vi and w′i = wi mod m.
5. EVMk: Pi = (wi, w′i, rwi = rui + rvi mod q), a proof that Cui ∗ Cvi is a commitment of wi.
6. EVMk → Vi: Print out the proof Pi, with w′i within Pi displayed in human-readable format, for the voter.
7. (optional) EVMk → VVPAT: printout of (ridi, vi). The voter must be able to check the printout before it is
dropped in the VVPAT box.
8. Vi → EVMk, POk (button press): an acknowledgement that indeed w′i = (vi + (ui mod m)) mod m (perhaps
with the help of a suitably designed auxiliary interface, such as a look-up table). The acknowledgement must
reach EVMk and POk through independent channels.
9. EVMk→ Vi: Print out commitment Cridi and signature µreceiptik = signek(Cridi , Cvi , Pi). Vi can now detach
the receipt.
10. POk: Sign σ′ackik = bsignpik(bridi) to certify that the voter corresponding to bridi has finished voting. This is
done using the secret key xkrpik(mod q − 1) corresponding to the ephemeral public key pik for this token (see
step 3 of Figure 4). Print (bridi, σ′ackik).
11. (optional) EVMk: The printout of (ridi, vi) drops into the VVPAT box. Afterwards, these printouts are unlink-
able with voters.
12. Vi leaves the booth with the remaining token (Cridi , Cui , λtokeni) and the EVM receipt
(Cridi , Cvi , Pi, µreceiptik) as overall receipt. Polling officer physically signs both papers and stamps
them using an official seal.
13. EVMk: Compute a hash hi = H((ridi, vi)), where H is a publicly known, collision and preimage resistant
cryptographic hash function [Rogaway and Shrimpton, 2004]. µhik = signek(hi).
14. EVMk: si = 〈ridi, ui, vi, bi, rIi , rui , rvi , pik〉; mi = 〈Cridi , Cui , Cvi , Pi, hi, λtokeni , µreceiptik , µhik〉.
15. EVMk: Encrypt encPEA(〈si,mi〉) using the public key of the election authority and store the encrypted record
〈bridi, hi, encPEA(〈si,mi〉)〉 indexed by bridi.
Note that the mod m addition in step 8 involves only small integers. The voter Vi casts a vote vi in the EVM, which
is obfuscated by adding with the obfuscation key ui mod m. A proof for the commitment Cui ∗ Cvi of wi, Pi, is
generated, and the voter confirms that w′i in Pi is correct.
Figure 5: The steps for voter Vi at the EVM.
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1. Polling officer → EVMk: The printouts (bridi, σ′ackik) (see step 10 of Figure 5) for all successful voters for
scanning.
2. EVMk: Add (bridi, σ′ackik) to its own encrypted record corresponding to bridi (see step 15 of Figure 5), gener-
ating the record 〈hi, encPEA(〈si,mi〉), bridi, σ′ackik〉. Any remaining EVM records without (bridi, σ′ackik)
are discarded but marked for audit. Nk is the count of valid votes acknowledged by the polling officer.
σNk = signpk(Nk)
3. EVMk: Compute Hk =
⊕
i hi and µHk = signek(Hk) (where
⊕
is the bitwise XOR operation).
4. EVMk → polling officer: (Hk, µHk) (printout or in electronic form for the polling officer).
5. The polling officer publishes (Hk, µHk), (Nk, σNk) along with the name of the polling booth on a bulletin board
BB1.
6. The polling officer submits the EVMk for uploading of its contents (See Figure 7). Polling is complete for
polling booth k.
Figure 6: For each polling booth k, after polling is over.
1. For each EVMk through a secure and private channel:
(a) Carry out a hardware and software integrity check of the EVM and flag for internal audit if found prob-
lematic.
(b) Collect each 〈encPEA(〈si,mi〉), bridi, σ′ackik〉.
2. Post collection from all EVMs, randomize the ordering of encrypted records 〈encPEA(〈si,mi〉), bridi, σ′ackik〉
using a shuffler and output the encrypted records as 〈encPEA(〈sj ,mj〉), bridj , σ′ackjk〉 to the election authority
through a secure and private channel.
Figure 7: Data collection after polling.
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1. Obtain 〈encPEA(〈si,mi〉), bridi, σ′ackiM 〉 (M represents an anonymous polling officer) and decrypt the en-
crypted portions. Internally verify each computation of each commitment and proof, that no two ridis are
within m of each other and that no two Cridis collide. Flag for internal audit if any found. Audit may revoke
anonymity of M .
2. Obtain σackiM = unblind(σ
′
ackiM
, bi) using blinding factor bi in the decrypted record. Flag for internal audit if
σackiM does not verify against ridi under public key pik stored in the decrypted record.
3. Store each record indexed by Ci = Cridi ∗ Cvi and Cridi .
4. (optional) Publish each [Cridi , wi = ui + vi] on a bulletin board BB2, sorted by Cridi . Anybody can download,
identify their Cridi from their receipts and verify that their wi is correctly recorded.
5. Publish rows [ridi, vi, ρi = ridi + vi, hi, µhiM , σackiM ] on a bulletin board BB3, sorted by ridi. The first
column of the table is the set Ψ and the third column is the set Φ. Anybody can download and verify that the
third column is a sum of the first two columns and that no two rows have the first column within ±m of each
other. They can also verify hi, group signature µhiM using the corresponding group public key, and signature
σackiM using the list of ephemeral public keys posted on BB0.
6. Demonstrate that
⊕
kHk =
⊕
i hi and
∑
kNk = N , where N is number of rows in BB3. This provides a
guarantee against injection of spurious votes pre-polling, and at the collection and shuffling stages. Anybody
can download and verify.
7. Tally the votes on BB3 and publish. Anybody can download and verify.
8. (optional) Count the VVPAT records and tally.
Figure 8: At the Election authority (EA).
1. Vi: Stamped token (Cridi , Cui , λtokeni) and EVM receipt (Cridi , Cvi , Pi, µreceiptik) where Pi = (wi, w
′
i, rwi)
(see step 12 of Figure 5).
2. Vi: Check that all signatures match, Cridi on the token and the EVM receipt match, Cui ∗ Cvi = gwihrwi and
w′i = wi mod m.
3. Vi −→• EA: 〈Cridi , Cvi〉 (EA receives a commitment pair from a voter through an anonymous channel for
verification, denoted by −→• ; EA should never see the voter, but only the commitments).
4. EA ↔ Vi: Provide ZKPs that Ci = Cridi ∗ Cvi corresponds to a ridi + vi ∈ Φ and Cridi corresponds to a
ridi ∈ Ψ [Camenisch et al., 2008]. (see supplementary Section B for the protocol).
Figure 9: Individual verifiability. The above steps can be carried out by a representative on behalf of Vi.
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id to the PO for signing. The PO gets to know nothing else about the token.
At the EVM, the voter casts the vote and a commitment is printed before any information about the token is fed
into the EVM. Thereafter, the token is scanned, and, through the interactive steps 3-6 of Figure 5, a proof of
the correctness of the commitment is printed. Through steps 8-9 the voter confirms the interaction and the EVM
commitments are signed and printed. All printouts are on a single paper receipt such that they are visible to the
voter but the receipt is not detachable until step 9.
Through steps 10-15 the PO confirms that the voting is complete by signing the blinded random id, and the EVM
consolidates, encrypts and stores the voting details.
After the polling is over the votes are consolidated as per Figure 6.
Data collection after polling: See Figure 7.
At the election authority (EA): See Figure 8.
Post polling voter verification: See Figure 9.
5 Attacks, correctness and secrecy
We provide an informal discussion on correctness and secrecy here. See supplementary Section C for formal proofs.
5.1 Correctness of the commitment of each vote
Assuming that the token issued to the voter is well-formed, the completeness and soundness of the vote commitment
scheme is established by the following two theorems (see supplementary Section C.1):
Theorem 1 (Completeness of the vote commitment scheme). Let u ∈ Zq denote a random number given by the PO to
the voter alongwith its commitment Cu = guhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote and let Cv = gvhrv denote its
commitment. If w = u + v, w′ = w mod m and rw = ru + rv mod q then w′ = (u mod m + v) mod m and
Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw .
Theorem 2 (Soundness of the vote commitment scheme). Let u ∈ Zq denote a random number given by the PO to
the voter alongwith its correct commitment Cu = guhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote, where m < q. If
Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw where w mod m = w′ = (u mod m+ v) mod m and rw ∈ Zq , then computing (v˜, rv) such that
Cv = g
v˜hrv and v˜ ∈ Zm\{v} is computationally hard.
Tricking the voter by recording a different u′i in the token and a different v
′
i in the EVM such that wi = u
′
i + v
′
i will
require the voter to pick a token containing a wrong commitment Cu′i and the EVMk to issue a wrong commitment Cv′i in
such a way that their product remains the same. This is prevented by the public auditability of the correctness of random
tokens in box Bk (see Section 5.3.1). Also, since the polling officer does not know any details about the voter’s token,
and the commitment from the EVM is obtained before giving it any information about the token, any targeted attacks are
prevented too.
5.2 Individual verifiability
Every voter can get the signatures onCridi ,Cui andCvi , and that Pi is an opening ofCui ∗Cvi , verified using the printouts
obtained from the polling officer and the EVM. They can also obtain ZKPs from the election authority - perhaps through
a representative - that the commitments Cridi ∗ Cvi and Cridi correspond to some ρi = ridi + vi ∈ Φ and ridi ∈ Ψ on
BB3 respectively.
Honestly generated ridi’s across polling booths are sparse in a very large space and the probability that there is another
within ridi±m (recall that vi ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1}) is negligible (O(m/q)). Collisions ofCridi ’s are similarly unlikely. This
not only ensures that the elements of Φ and Ψ are unique with overwhelming probability, but that the ridi and ridi + vi
come from the same row in BB3 in the ZKPs. Anybody can check if the Cridi ’s collide or the ridi’s are too close on the
sorted bulletin boards and call for an audit if found.
More formally, we prove the following theorem in supplementary Section C.2.
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Theorem 3 (Individual verifiability). Let Cridi be the commitment issued on the token picked by voter i, and vi ∈ Zm be
her intended vote. If one performs the additional verification of Figure 9 for i, then with overwhelming probability, a row
having 〈ridi, vi〉 as the first two columns exists on BB3, where ridi is the opening of Cridi .
In addition, for satisfaction, the voters can verify on BB2 that wi corresponding to what they have in Pi has been
correctly recorded against their Cridi .
5.2.1 Dispute resolution
Non-repudiability of the voter is derived from the individual verifiability of recorded-as-intended by an independent judge
(Theorem 3). Non-repudiability of the election authorities is derived from the signatures on the voter’s receipts. Mix-and-
match of unrelated EVM receipts and tokens is prevented by the inclusion of Cridi in both of them.
5.3 Universal verifiability
The tally of votes can be verified by anybody on BB3.
5.3.1 Well-formedness of the tokens
We require tokens to be pre-printed and randomly chosen by the voters (Figures 3 and 4). This along with the public audit
of sufficient (as determined by the hypergeometric distribution for a high enough confidence level) random tokens from
box Bk ensures well-formedness of the tokens, without any trust on authorities or special auditors.
5.3.2 No vote deletion or tampering
Sufficient number of voters verifying that their vote was recorded as intended (Theorem 3) gives strong guarantees that no
votes have been deleted or tampered.
5.3.3 Protection against ballot replay attacks
Malicious collisions of ridis of different voters - aimed at counting identical votes of multiple voters as one vote - are
prevented by the public audit of sufficient number of tokens inserted in box Bk (step 4 of Figure 4) for uniqueness. Also,
since all the tokens are pre-generated in bulk, such collisions are independent of the voters. In case of a collision, the
verification of Figure 9 passes only if the voters involved in the collision vote identically. Sufficient number of voter
verifications of Figure 9 guard against this attack.
5.3.4 Prevention of spurious vote injection
Any post-polling vote manipulation is prevented because of the following theorem (see supplementary Section C.3):
Theorem 4 (No vote injection/deletion/tampering post polling). Let ridi ∈ Zq be a random number issued to voter i at
the polling booth, vi ∈ Zm be her vote as intended and hi = H((ridi, vi)) be the hash of her vote, whereH is a preimage
resistant and collision resistant hash function. Let Vk denote the votes cast in polling booth k and V denote the votes for
which a row containing columns 〈ridi, vi, ridi + vi, hi, µhiM 〉 exists on BB3. Let Hk =
⊕
i∈Vk hi be the hash computed
by EVMk and H =
⊕
i∈V hi, where
⊕
denotes the bitwise-XOR operation. If
⊕
kHk = H and (ridi, vi) is unique for
each row, then
1. injecting votes after polling is complete (step 6 of Figure 6) is computationally hard.
2. probability that any votes were deleted after polling is complete is negligible.
Manipulations before or during polling, perhaps via a tampered EVM, are not possible because the EVM cannot
introduce fake rows without a signed acknowledgment by a polling officer. These signed acknowledgments are publicly
auditable (step 5 of Figure 8). Only the presiding polling officer can create the secret key to sign the acknowledgment for
a token by combining its own secret key xk with the secret key in the token (see step 3 of Figure 4 and step 10 of Figure 5).
The presiding polling officer can also prevent spurious vote injections by unauthorised people (e.g., other polling officers)
by uploading a signed count of valid votes acknowledged by her (Figure 6). Thus, spurious vote injection would require
simultaneous vote deletion, which is prevented by Theorem 3 (see Section 5.3.2).
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Finally, vote injection by a polling officer who bypasses the identity verification of voters and allows ineligible voters
to vote is beyond the scope of this protocol.
The verifiability guarantees presented above hold even if the authorities collude with each other.
More formally, we prove the following theorem in supplementary Section C.3.
Theorem 5 (Universal verifiability). Given that the voter-verification steps of Figure 9 passed for a statistically sufficient
number of voters, anyone can verify that the final tally is correct, each vote has been counted as intended by its voter, and
no spurious votes have been injected (assuming that polling officers do not allow fake voters).
5.4 Secrecy and receipt freeness
We assume that the EVM does not leak information and does not store any information corresponding to any voter. We
also assume that the election authority keeps all the random secrets secure in storage and transit.
Voter i only gives the chit containing the blinded random identifier bridi to the polling officer, which cannot be linked
with the ridi posted on BB3. The voter only sees u′i = ui mod m in human-readable format which is destroyed at the
EVM and hence cannot be used to prove how they voted. All other secrets in the token, e.g., rIi , rui , ridi, ui, etc., are not
human readable and thus cannot be read by bare-handed voters.
The voter’s EVM receipt and the token contain commitments (Cridi , Cui , Cvi) from which none of ridi, ui or vi can
be determined. If ui is secret then the probability of being able to derive vi from wi is almost equal for each vote (see
Theorem 6). It is also computationally hard to figure out the secrets rui and rvi from rui + rvi mod q, Cui and Cvi .
Hence Pi also does not reveal any information. Finally, the signatures λtokeni and µreceiptik do not reveal anything about
ridi or vi because the messages signed by them do not. Thus the receipt-free property is maintained.
BB2 publishes [Cridi , wi = ui + vi] and BB3 publishes
[
ridj , vj , ridj + vj , (hj , µhjM ), σackjM )
]
, sorted by Cridi
and ridj respectively. These records cannot be combined to determine which j corresponds to which i thereby providing
perfect secrecy. Also, the voter’s receipt can not be linked with a row on BB3. Voters’ representatives do not obtain any
information about rid or v because of the zero-knowledge property of the set-membership proofs.
The anonymity of group signatures (and random ordering of ephemeral public keys in BB0) ensures that records in
BB3 contain no information about which record came from which EVM or polling booth. This makes polling booth level
profiling of communities impossible.
Finally, we assume that the election authority will never leak the decryptions of encPEA(〈si,mi〉), even to an insider.
If these records are leaked, then any coercer or profiler who may have harvested the receipts issued to the voters will be
able to determine the votes corresponding to the receipts.
More formally, we prove the following theorems on receipt freeness and individual and community vote secrecy in
supplementary Section C.4.
Theorem 6 (Receipt freeness). Let u ∈ Zq denote the random obfuscation key given to the voter alongwith its commitment
Cu = g
uhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote and let Cv = gvhrv denote its commitment. Let P = (w,w′, rw) where
w = u+ v, w′ = w mod m and rw = ru + rv mod q. Given that m q, the tuple R(v, u) := (Cu, Cv, P ) posseses
ciphertext indistinguishability.
Theorem 7 (Individual and community vote secrecy). Assuming that the Polling Officer (PO), the Election Authority (EA)
and the EVM behave honestly, our protocol does not leak any information on a voter’s intended vote vi beyond what the
outcome of the election reveals.
The protocol is also resistant to chain-voting attacks because the polling officer only signs acknowledgments against
rids that exist in tokens freshly drawn from the box (see Figures 4 and 5), and does not allow voters to use old tokens
given to them by a coercer.
6 Practicalities of implementation
Voters need to verify the modular sum mentally. A suitably designed look-up table (see Figure 1e) can be published in the
EVM booth to aid the voters in performing this verification. For elections with largem, more sophisticated user interfaces
would need to be designed.
The ZKP set-membership protocol is based on bilinear maps (see supplementary Section B), which are usually realized
only for elliptic curves. All operations in Section 3 are equally valid for cyclic groups of elliptic curves over a finite field
instead of modular subgroups of Zp. Hence we present our analysis on groups over elliptic curves.
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We consider a prototypical high security elliptic curve, a Type a1 elliptic curve of the PBC library [Lynn, 2013] with
a base field size of 1024 bits (p such that log p = 1024), a group order of 160 bits (q such that log q = 160) and an
embedding size of 2. The discrete log problem is believed to be hard for such groups. The security of the set-membership
protocol depends on the N -SDH assumption [Boneh and Boyen, 2004, Camenisch et al., 2008], where N = |Φ| is the
number of voters in a constituency. For N ≈ 106 the chosen curve is secure against the best known attacks on this
assumption [Brown and Gallant, 2004, Cheon, 2006].
The election authority needs to print the signed commitments, random secrets and the blinded ridi on each token
(Figure 3). Cridi and Cui are group elements, i.e., points on the elliptic curve, and each requires 2 ∗ log p = 2048 bits for
representing its two coordinates. A typical high-security RSA modulus is of 2048 bits and RSA signatures in this modulus
take 2048 bits. Thus the signed commitments take 6144 bits. Random secrets (rIi , rui , ridi, ui, u
′
i) are of log q = 160
bits each, except u′i which is a small integer (< m) to be printed in clear text. Secrets related to group signatures, i.e.,
(pik, rpik) also take log q = 160 bits each, and secrets related to blind signatures, i.e., (bridi, bi) take 2 log q = 320
bits and log q = 160 bits respectively (using the blind signature scheme of Mohammed et al. [2000]). The token’s three
components thus each take less than 1 KB and can easily fit into adjacent QR codes in a piece of paper (the largest QR
codes can fit around 3 KB of binary data). Using PBC library, the time required to generate the group generators g and
h for the elliptic curve we selected were 6.7 ms on the average and generating a Pedersen commitment took 28 ms on
average on commodity hardware.
During polling, the polling officer machine and the EVM need to be connected to a QR code scanner. The polling
officer needs to blind sign an acknowledgment, which is very efficient [Mohammed et al., 2000]. The EVM needs to print
group signatures on the voter’s receipt. Short group signatures [Boneh et al., 2004] require roughly the same size as that
of RSA signatures, thus taking roughly 2048 bits. Signing and verifying short group signatures [Boneh et al., 2004] takes
less than 100 ms [Diaz et al., 2015]. Overall, the EVM needs to print (Cvi , Pi, (Cridi , µreceiptik)) for the voter (Figure 5)
in succession on a single piece of paper. All of these items can easily fit into modern QR codes. w′i needs to be printed
in clear text. We also need the EVM or a poll worker to destroy the part of the token containing the random secrets after
they are scanned.
The operations of Figures 6, 7 and 8 are all of O(N) and can be computed efficiently. Checking if each PO signature
is made using one of the ephemeral public keys, the public keys identifying the signatures on BB3 and those in BB0 can
be downloaded and compared in O(N logN) time.
The two ZKPs of set membership (step 4 of Figure 9; also supplementary Section B) incur a one-time cost of down-
loading sets Φ and Ψ (of total size 2N log q bits - roughly 38 MB for N = 106) and uploading 2N Boneh-Boyen
signatures per verifier - N for each ZKP (of total size 2N ∗ (2 log p) - roughly 488 MB for N = 106). Computation of
N Boneh-Boyen signatures requires N inverse calculations in group Zq and N group exponentiations (scalar multipli-
cations) in the elliptic curve group. Given a particular voter’s commitment Ci, the set-membership protocol requires an
O(1) lookup (using the Ci index created in step 3 of Figure 8) and a small number of bilinear map evaluations and group
exponentiations. In our experiments using the PBC library, on average one bilinear map evalutation took 22 ms. Standard
fast algorithms exist for inverse calculation and group exponentiation too.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting protocol whose correctness and secrecy properties can be
formally established. The recorded-as-intended and counted-as-recorded guarantees are not only universally verifiable but
are also individually verifiable. The protocol is scalable, efficient and easy to implement.
Though the requirements from the voter are simple, the protocol does rely on several cryptographic constructs to
establish its correctness. Hence, building public trust on the protocol may require some special efforts. While banning
electronic voting the German Constitutional Court made the following observation [NDI, 2019]:
“The use of voting machines which electronically record the voters’ votes and electronically ascertain the
election result only meets the constitutional requirements if the essential steps of the voting and of the as-
certainment of the result can be examined reliably and without any specialist knowledge of the subject . . .
”
Whether the protocol is simple enough to pass the test proposed by the German constitutional court, and is fit for large
scale deployment in countries with low digital literacy, has to be carefully evaluated.
Finally, the bigger problem of electoral democracy of creating an accurate de-duplicated voter’s list [National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 2018] that has no spurious entries and does not exclude any rightful voter is still
very much an open problem.
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Supplementary material
A Modular groups
For two integers a and b we write a = b (mod n) if b is the remainder when a is divided by n. We then say that a and b
are congruent modulo n. For example, 18 = 4 (mod 7) and−18 = 3 (mod 7). When the context of modulo n is obvious,
we write this simply as a = b.
The set Zn = {0, 1, . . . n− 1} is the set of all remainders modulo n. Zn supports two basic operations, addition and
multiplication, in the obvious way. For example, (11 + 13) = 8 (mod 16) and (11 · 13) = 15 (mod 16).
A group is a set with an operation which is closed, has an identity, is associative, and every element has an inverse.
In addition, a group which is commutative is called abelian. An abelian group is called cyclic if there is a special
element, called the generator, from which every other element can be obtained either by repeated application of the group
operation, or by the use of the inverse operation. If g is a generator of the cyclic group G we often write G = 〈g〉. If G is
multiplicative then every element h of G can be written as h = gx for some integer x.
If n = p is a prime, then for all non-zero a ∈ Zp, ax = 1 (mod p) has a unique solution and a has a multiplicative
inverse. Such a Zp is a Field. A multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p = {1, 2, . . . , p− 1} is a non-empty subset G such that if
a, b ∈ G then ab ∈ G. Thus any subgroup contains 1, and the multiplicative inverse of every element is in the subgroup.
If G is a subgroup of Z∗p of size q, then q divides p− 1.
Any non-trivial a ∈ Z∗p generates a cyclic group {a, a2, . . . , ad = 1}, for some d. Thus d, the order of the group,
divides p − 1, hence ap−1 = 1. All subgroups of a cyclic group are cyclic. If G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group of order n, then
for each divisor d of n there exists exactly one subgroup of order d and it can be generated by an/d.
Finally, the discrete logarithm problem for a cyclic group - that of determining x from the equation h = gx is believed
to be hard.
B ZKP of set membership
Common Input: A Group Gq = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉, a commitment C, and a set Φ
Prover Input: ρ, r such that C = gρhr and ρ ∈ Φ
P
y,{Ai}←−−−−− V Verifier picks random x ∈ Zq and sends y ← gx and Ai ← g 1x+i for every i ∈ Φ.
P
V−−−−−→ V Prover picks random v ∈ Zp and sends V ← Avρ.
Prover and verifier run PK{(ρ, r, v) : C = gρhr ∧ V = g vx+ρ }
P
a,D−−−−−→ V Prover picks random s, t,m ∈ Zq and sends a← e(V, g)−se(g, g)t and D ← gshm.
P
c←−−−−− V Verifier sends a random challenge c ∈ Zq .
P
zρ,zv,zr−−−−−→ V Prover sends zρ = s− ρc, zv = t− vc, and zr = m− rc,
Verifier checks that D ?= Cchzrgzρ and that a ?= e(V, y)c · e(V, g)−zρ · e(g, g)zv
Figure 10: Set membership protocol for set Φ [Camenisch et al., 2008]
Definition B.1. For an instance of commitment C, a proof of set membership with respect to a set Φ is a zero knowledge
proof of knowledge of (ρ, r) such that C = gρhr ∧ ρ ∈ Φ.
The ZKP protocol requires bilinear groups and associated hardness assumptions. Let G take a security parameter k
written in unary as input and output a description of a bilinear group (p,Gq, GT , e)← G(1k) such that
1. p is a k-bit prime.
2. Gq , GT are cyclic groups of order q. Let G∗q = Gq \ {1} and let g ∈ G∗q .
3. e : Gq ×Gq → GT is a bilinear map (pairing) such that ∀a, b : e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab.
4. If g generates Gq then e(g, g) generates GT .
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5. Membership in Gq ,GT can be efficiently decided, group operations and the pairing e are efficiently computable,
generators are efficiently sample-able, and the descriptions of the groups and group elements each have size O(k)
bits.
The ZKP protocol relies on the Boneh-Boyen short signature scheme [Boneh and Boyen, 2004]. The secret key of the
signer is x ← Zq , the corresponding public key is y = gx. The signature on a message ρ is m ← g1/(x+ρ); verification
is done by checking that e(m, y · gρ) = e(g, g). Suppose the |Φ|-Strong Diffie Hellman assumption (|Φ|-SDH) holds in
(Gq, GT ), then the basic Boneh-Boyen signature scheme is |Φ|-secure against an existential forgery under a weak chosen
message attack [Boneh and Boyen, 2004].
A honest-verifier zero knowledge proof under a strong Diffie-Hellman assumption associated with the above pairing
generator (G) is given by the set membership protocol in Figure 10 [Camenisch et al., 2008]. Standard techniques exist to
efficiently convert an honest-verifier zero knowledge proof to a general zero-knowledge proof [Cramer et al., 2000].
Note that if Φ is stored indexed by C, then the ZKP of set membership is computationally efficient and requires only
O(1) sized proofs [Camenisch et al., 2008]. Also, the first communication in Figure 10 from each verifier to the prover
needs to happen only once.
C Proofs of correctness of commitments, individual and universal verifiability,
and secrecy
C.1 Correctness of the commitment of each vote
Theorem 1 (Completeness of vote commitment scheme). Let u ∈ Zq denote a random number given by the PO to
the voter alongwith its commitment Cu = guhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote and let Cv = gvhrv denote its
commitment. If w = u + v, w′ = w mod m and rw = ru + rv mod q then w′ = (u mod m + v) mod m and
Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw .
Proof. The statement w′ = (u mod m+ v) mod m follows directly from the laws of modular arithmetic. Cu ∗ Cv =
guhru ∗ gvhrv = gu+vhru+rv = gwhnq+((ru+rv) mod q) = gwhnq+rw , for some n ∈ Z. Since h is a generator of group
Zq , hnq = 1. Thus, Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw .
Theorem 2 (Soundness of vote commitment scheme). Let u ∈ Zq denote a random number given by the PO to the voter
alongwith its correct commitment Cu = guhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote, where m < q. If Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw
where w mod m = w′ = (u mod m + v) mod m and rw ∈ Zq , then computing (v˜, rv) such that Cv = gv˜hrv and
v˜ ∈ Zm\{v} is computationally hard.
Proof. Suppose Cv = gv˜hrv where v˜ ∈ Zm\{v} (each member of the group generated by generators g and h can
be expressed in this form). Since Cu ∗ Cv = gwhrw , we have gu+v˜hru+rv = gwhrw by the law of exponents. Let
u′ = u mod m and u′′ = u div m. It is given that w′ = w mod m. Let w′′ = w div m. We thus have
gu
′′m+u′+v˜hru+rv = gw
′′m+w′hrw (1)
By the computational binding property of Pedersen commitments, Equation 1 implies that a polynomial-time adversary
is computationally bound to satify the following equation:
u′′m+ u′ + v˜ = w′′m+ w′ (2)
We now focus on proving v˜ = v. We have w′ = (u+ v) mod m.
Case 1: u′ + v < m. In this case, w′ = u′ + v. Thus, we have
u′′m+ u′ + v˜ = w′′m+ u′ + v
∴ u′′m+ v˜ = w′′m+ v
(3)
Since v < m and v˜ < m, we must have u′′ = w′′ and v˜ = v from the above equation.
Case 2: m ≤ u′ + v < 2m− 1. In this case, w′ = u′ + v −m. Thus, we have
u′′m+ u′ + v˜ = w′′m+ u′ + v −m
∴ u′′m+ v˜ = (w′′ − 1)m+ v (4)
Again, since v < m and v˜ < m, we must have u′′ = w′′ − 1 and v˜ = v from the above equation.
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C.2 Individual verifiability
Theorem 3 (Individual verifiability). Let Cridi be the commitment issued on the token picked by voter i, and vi ∈ Zm be
her intended vote. If one performs the additional verification of Figure 9 for i, then with overwhelming probability, a row
having 〈ridi, vi〉 as the first two columns exists on BB3, where ridi is the opening of Cridi .
Proof. By Theorem 2, assuming polynomial-time adversary and correct Cui , we have Cvi = g
vihrvi . (Correctness of
Cui is established probabilistically by the independence of Cvi from Cui , and the pre-generation of tokens in bulk.) Given
the commitment Ci = Cridi ∗ Cvi , by the soundness of the ZKP of set membership on set Φ, an element ridi + vi exists
in the third column of BB3.
Also, the ZKP of set-membership for commitment Cridi on set Ψ ensures that an element ridi exists on the first
column of BB3. Since BB3 is verified for no collision upto ridi ±m and vi ∈ Zm, this implies that the row containing
ridi is also the row containing ridi + vi. (The probability of such collisions for honestly generated random numbers is
given by the solution to the birthday problem as approximately 1 − exp(−N(N−1)(q/m) ), where N is the number of rows in
BB3, which is negligible for large q/m.)
The verification of the invariant property that the third column of BB3 is a sum of the first two columns of BB3 finally
ensures that the second column of the row containing ridi is vi.
C.3 Universal verifiability
Theorem 4 (No vote injection/deletion/tampering post polling). Let ridi ∈ Zq be a random number issued to voter i at
the polling booth, vi ∈ Zm be her vote as intended and hi = H((ridi, vi)) be the hash of her vote, whereH is a preimage
resistant and collision resistant hash function. Let Vk denote the votes cast in polling booth k and V denote the votes for
which a row containing columns 〈ridi, vi, ridi + vi, hi, µhiM 〉 exists on BB3. Let Hk =
⊕
i∈Vk hi be the hash computed
by EVMk and H =
⊕
i∈V hi, where
⊕
denotes the bitwise-XOR operation. If
⊕
kHk = H and (ridi, vi) is unique for
each row, then
1. injecting votes after after polling is complete (step 6 of Figure 6) is computationally hard.
2. probability that any votes were deleted after polling is complete is negligible.
Proof. Suppose there exist some fake votes in BB3 that do not exist in any Vk. Let’s denote such votes by Vfake. Further,
suppose that some votes were deleted, i.e. they were counted in some Vk but their corresponding row does not appear in
BB3. Let’s denote such votes by Vdel. We thus have:
V =
((⋃
k
Vk
)
∪ Vfake
)
\ Vdel (5)
Since
⊕
kHk = H and Hk =
⊕
i∈Vk hi, we have:⊕
k
⊕
i∈Vk
H((ridi, vi)) =
⊕
i∈V
H((ridi, vi)) (6)
By Equations 5 and 6 and the properties of XOR, we have:(⊕
k
⊕
i∈Vk
H((ridi, vi))
)
⊕
( ⊕
i∈Vdel
H((ridi, vi))
)
=(⊕
k
⊕
i∈Vk
H((ridi, vi))
)
⊕
( ⊕
i∈Vfake
H((ridi, vi))
)
=⇒
⊕
i∈Vdel
H((ridi, vi)) =
⊕
i∈Vfake
H((ridi, vi))
(7)
Lemma 4.1. Vfake = φ.
23
Proof. Suppose there exist some k fake votes (k ≥ 1). Consider the last fake vote i0 ∈ Vfake. For Equation 7 to hold
true, we must have
H((ridi0 , vi0)) =
( ⊕
i∈Vfake\{i0}
H((ridi, vi))
)
⊕
( ⊕
i∈Vdel
H((ridi, vi))
) (8)
Since (ridi, vi) are all unique, the preimage resistance property of the hash function H implies that finding a new
preimage (ridi0 , vi0) such that its hash matches the RHS is computationally hard. This means that injecting fake votes
after the polling booth is computationally hard.
Lemma 4.2. Vdel = φ.
Proof. Suppose some k votes (k ≥ 1) are deleted. Consider the last such deleted vote i0 ∈ Vdel. For Equation 7 to hold
true, we must have
H((ridi0 , vi0)) =
⊕
i∈Vdel\{i0}
H((ridi, vi)) (9)
since from the previous lemma, we know that Vfake = φ.
From the collision-resistance property of the hash function H, the probability that the hash of a given (ridi0 , vi0) for
random ridi0 is equal to the RHS is negligible. This means that the probability that any k votes (k ≥ 1) were deleted after
polling is negligible.
Theorem 5 (Universal verifiability). Given that the voter-verification steps of Figure 9 passed for a statistically sufficient
number of voters, anyone can verify that the final tally is correct, each vote has been counted as intended by its voter, and
no spurious votes have been injected (assuming that polling officers do not allow fake voters).
Proof. First, note that anybody can tally the total number of votes for each candidate on BB3.
By Theorem 4, nobody can create fake votes, change existing votes or delete any vote after polling is complete (i.e.
after BB1 is populated with the correct hashes and counts).
By Theorem 3 a voter performing the verifications of Figure 9 would fail the ZKP with overwhelming probability if
her vote was deleted or changed. Sufficient number of such verifications by random voters thus protect against any vote
being deleted or tampered.
If the ZKP of set membership passes for voter i, it means that a row containing (ridi, vi) exists on BB3. For authorities
to orchestrate a token replay attack such that theCridi , Cvi for multiple voters map to the same (ridj , vj) row on BB3, they
have to ensure that the voters who pick the tokens with colliding rids vote the same way. This is something which cannot
be controlled by the authorities and some voters with the same token are likely to vote differently. Sufficient verifications
of Figure 9 by voters ensure that such collisions cannot happen without being caught. Also, sufficient number of random
tokens can also be audited by anyone, including voters and independent auditors in the polling booth, for uniqueness.
Finally, a tampered EVMk cannot introduce fake rows because every row must contain a signed acknowledgment by
a polling officer. Only the presiding polling officer can create a signature because the secret key of a token is derived from
the polling officer’s secret key xk and the secret rpik printed in the chit of the token. Protection against a presiding officer
bypassing the identity verification of an incoming voter during polling and allowing them to vote is beyond the scope of
our protocol.
C.4 Secrecy and receipt freeness
Definition C.1 (Ciphertext indistinguishability1). An encryption scheme E : M×K→ C, for encrypting messages from
message space M using keys from key space K to produce ciphertexts in ciphertext space C, is said to possess ciphertext
indistinguishability if for each polynomially-bounded adversary A, the advantage of A (defined below) is negligible in
the following indistinguishability game between a challenger and the adversary.
• Challenger chooses a key k uniformly randomly from the key space K.
1More precisely, this is the definition of ciphertext indistinguishability under a chosen plaintext attack, where the adversary chooses plaintexts of her
choice and tries to guess which plaintext a given ciphertext encrypts.
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• Adversary sends m0,m1 ∈M to the challenger.
• Challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and sends cb = E(mb, k) to the adversary.
• Adversary outputs b′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess of b.
The advantage of the adversary A in the above game is given by:
AdvCI [A, c] =
∣∣∣ Pr
k∈K
[b = 1 ∧ b′ = 1]−
Pr
k∈K
[b = 0 ∧ b′ = 1]
∣∣∣ (10)
Theorem 6 (Receipt freeness). Let u ∈ Zq denote the random obfuscation key given to the voter alongwith its commitment
Cu = g
uhru . Let v ∈ Zm denote the voter’s vote and let Cv = gvhrv denote its commitment. Let P = (w,w′, rw) where
w = u+ v, w′ = w mod m and rw = ru + rv mod q. Given that m q, the tuple R(v, u) := (Cu, Cv, P ) posseses
ciphertext indistinguishability.
Proof. By the perfect hiding property of Pedersen commitments and because revealing rw does not reveal anything about
ru or rv , we know that commitments Cu and Cv are perfectly hiding. Perfect hiding is a stronger property than ciphertext
indistinguishability, therefore Cu and Cv are both ciphertext indistinguishable.
To prove P is ciphertext indistinguishable, first note that since rw is a function of random numbers independent of v,
rw cannot possibly leak any information about v and is thus ciphertext indistinguishable. Below we prove that w and w′
are ciphertext indistinguishable.
The indistinguishability game for w proceeds between a polynomial-time challenger and a polynomial-time adversary
A as follows:
• Challenger chooses a random u ∈ Zq .
• Adversary sends votes v0, v1 ∈ Zm to the challenger.
• Challenger chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and sends wb = u+ vb to the adversary.
• Adversary outputs b′ = A(wb) ∈ {0, 1} as its guess of b.
Let the event b = 0 ∧ b′ = 1 be denoted by A0 and the event b = 1 ∧ b′ = 1 be denoted by A1. We have to show that:
AdvCI [A, w] =
∣∣Pr[A0]− Pr[A1]∣∣ (11)
is negligible.
We show the above by showing that an adversary A with a non-negligible advantage AdvCI [A, w] =  can be used
to create an adversary A∗ with a non-negligible advantage AdvCI [A∗, w∗] in the following indistinguishability game for
modular addition with a random number, which is known to be perfectly hiding.
• A challenger C∗ chooses a random u∗ ∈ Zq .
• Adversary A∗ sends v0, v1 ∈ Zq to the challenger.
• Challenger chooses b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and sends w∗b = u∗ + vb mod q to the adversary.
• Adversary outputs b′∗ = A∗(w∗b ) ∈ {0, 1} as its guess of b∗.
We construct adversary A∗ using adversary A and a challenger C internally as follows:
• C∗ chooses a random u∗ ∈ Zq .
• A sends votes v0, v1 ∈ Zm to C, who then forwards it to C∗. (Note that v0, v1 ∈ Zq too.)
• C∗ chooses b∗ ∈ {0, 1} and sends w∗b = u∗ + vb mod q to A∗.
• C inside A∗ forwards w∗b to A and obtains its output b′ = A(w∗b ) ∈ {0, 1}. If w∗b ∈ [0,m) ∪ [q −m, q), then it
ignores A’s output and outputs b′∗ = 1 with probability 12 . Otherwise, it outputs b
′∗ = b′.
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Let the event b∗ = 0 ∧ b′∗ = 1 be denoted by A∗0 and the event b∗ = 1 ∧ b′∗ = 1 be denoted by A∗1. Let S1 = [0, q −m)
and S2 = [m, q − 2m).
AdvCI [A∗, w∗]
=
∣∣Pr[A∗0]− Pr[A∗1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr[A∗0 ∧ u∗ ∈ S1]− Pr[A∗1 ∧ u∗ ∈ S1]+
Pr[A∗0 ∧ u∗ 6∈ S1]− Pr[A∗1 ∧ u∗ 6∈ S1]
∣∣
=
∣∣q −m
q
(
Pr[A∗0 | u∗ ∈ S1]− Pr[A∗1 | u∗ ∈ S1]
)
+
m
q
(
Pr[A∗0 | u∗ 6∈ S1]− Pr[A∗1 | u∗ 6∈ S1]
)∣∣
(12)
If u∗ 6∈ S1, i.e. u∗ ∈ [q −m, q) then w∗b ∈ [0,m) ∪ [q −m, q), since vb ∈ Zm. In this case, A∗ outputs b′∗ = 1 with
a constant probability 12 , independent of b
∗. Thus:
AdvCI [A∗, w∗]
=
∣∣q −m
q
(
Pr[A∗0 | u∗ ∈ S1]− Pr[A∗1 | u∗ ∈ S1]
)∣∣
=
∣∣q −m
q
(
Pr[A∗0 ∧ u∗ ∈ S2 | u∗ ∈ S1]−
Pr[A∗1 ∧ u∗ ∈ S2 | u∗ ∈ S1]+
Pr[A∗0 ∧ u∗ 6∈ S2 | u∗ ∈ S1]−
Pr[A∗1 ∧ u∗ 6∈ S2 | u∗ ∈ S1]
)∣∣
=
∣∣q −m
q
(q − 3m
q −m
(
Pr[A∗0 | u∗ ∈ S2]−
Pr[A∗1 | u∗ ∈ S2]
)
+
2m
q −m
(
Pr[A∗0 | u∗ ∈ S1 \ S2]−
Pr[A∗1 | u∗ ∈ S1 \ S2]
))∣∣
(13)
Note that if u∗ ∈ S2, then w∗b ∈ [m, q −m) for any choice of vb, since vb ∈ Zm. Thus, b′∗ in this case is A(w∗b ).
Also, in this case, w∗b = u
∗ + vb mod q = u + vb = w for u = u∗. In other words, Pr[A∗0 | u∗ ∈ S2] − Pr[A∗1 | u∗ ∈
S2] = AdvCI [A, w] = . The second term of Equation 13 is lower-bounded by − 2mq−m . Thus,
AdvCI [A∗, w∗]
≥ ∣∣q −m
q
( (q − 3m)
q −m −
2m
q −m
)∣∣
≥ ∣∣ (q − 3m)
q
− 2m
q
)∣∣
(14)
Since m q, this advantage is non-negligible.
Since w′ is a function of w and protocol constant m, w′ is also ciphertext indistinguishable. Therefore, tuple R(v, u)
is ciphertext indistinguishable.
Theorem 7 (Individual and community vote secrecy). Assuming that the Polling Officer (PO), the Election Authority (EA)
and the EVM behave honestly, our protocol does not leak any information on a voter’s intended vote vi beyond what the
outcome of the election reveals.
Proof. Voter i only gives the chit containing the blinded random identifier bridi to the polling officer, which cannot be
linked with the ridi posted on BB3. Since voters are bare-handed, they cannot read any non-human readable token secrets
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(rIi , rui , ridi, ui, bridi, bi, pik, rpik) in the polling booth. The human-readable secret u
′
i = ui mod m is destroyed at
the polling booth.
Consider the token T = (Cridi , Cui , λtokeni) and the EVM receipt R = (Cridi , Cvi , Pi, µreceiptik) obtained by
voter i at polling booth k. Cridi does not leak any information about ridi because of the perfect hiding property of
Pedersen commitments. (Cui , Cvi , Pi) do not leak any information about vi by Theorem 6. The signatures do not leak
any information about 〈ridi, vi〉 because the corresponding messages do not.
The hashes and signatures published on BB1 do not reveal any information about 〈ridi, vi〉 because of the hash
function’s preimage resistance property. The (Cridi , wi) tuple published on BB2 does not reveal any information about
〈ridi, vi〉 because of wi’s ciphertext indistinguishability (see Theorem 6). Since the token T and receipt R reveal no
information about a voter’s 〈ridi, vi〉 pair and since the rows at BB3 are randomly shuffled (see Figure 7), a row on BB3
cannot be linked to a given voter using the tuple (ridi, vi, ρi = ridi+vi, hi = H(ridi, vi)). Also, a voter can not be linked
to a row on BB3 using the signatures µhiM and σackiM because the corresponding messages are functions of (ridi, vi)
and because of the anonymity property of group signatures which hides which polling booth the given vote comes from
(for σackiM the anonymity of the group signature comes from the random ordering of the ephemeral public keys posted
on BB0).
The representative of Figure 9 does not obtain any information about 〈ridi, vi〉 because of the zero-knowledge property
of the set-membership proofs.
D Practicalities of implementation
The set-membership protocol of Section 3.2 is based on bilinear maps, which are usually realized only for elliptic curves.
All operations in Section 3 are equally valid for cyclic groups of elliptic curves over a finite field instead of modular
groups of Zp. Hence we present our analysis on groups over elliptic curves.
We consider a prototypical high security elliptic curve with a base field size of 1024 bits (log p = 1024), a group order
of 160 bits (log q = 160) and an embedding size of 2. Note that p and q are large primes such that q divides p−1 (Section
3).
The security of the Pedersen commitments in our protocol is derived from the hardness of the discrete log problem in
the chosen group. A discrete log problem that requires O(
√
q) ≡ 2160/2 = 280 exponentiations is considered safe from
the best known attacks on elliptic curves. The security of a well chosen such curve and that of a 2048 bit finite field are
roughly equivalent [Lynn, 2013].
The security of the set membership protocol is derived from the hardness of the |Φ|-SDH problem in the chosen group
[Boneh and Boyen, 2004, Camenisch et al., 2008], where |Φ| is the total size of the electorate in a constituency. Brown
and Gallant [2004] and Cheon [2006] have shown that in groups of order q, the |Φ|-SDH problem can be solved with
O(
√
q/d +
√
d) exponentiations, for any divisor d ≤ |Φ| of q − 1. Assuming the typical size of a constituency to be
|Φ| ≡ 106 ≡ 220, and considering the best case scenario from an adversary’s point of view, the |Φ|-SDH problem can be
solved in O(
√
q/|Φ|) ≡ 2(160−20)/2 = 270 exponentiations. This can be considered adequately safe, and breaking the set
membership protocol will be practically impossible for the chosen curve.
Each element of the group is a point on the elliptic curve and requires O(log p) space to represent both its coordi-
nates. An operation in this group requires a constant number of field multiplications and additions, thereby requiring at
most O(log2 p) bit operations. The exponentiation operation - also called the scalar multiplication operation in case of
elliptic curves - requires O(log q) group operations using the standard double-and-add algorithm, requiring a maximum
of O(log q log2 p) bit operations.
The polling booth protocol of Figures 3 and 5 requires computation of a constant number of Pedersen commitments,
and each Pedersen commitment requires 2 exponentiations and a group operation, amounting to O(log q log2 p) bit op-
erations. In addition, the polling booth protocol requires a constant number of cryptographic signatures and public key
encryptions for which standard fast algorithms are known.
The polling officer needs to print out the signed commitments (Cridi , σridik), (Cui , σuik) and (ridi, ui) for the voter.
Cridi andCui are group elements, each of log p = 1024 bits. For RSA signatures the sizes are of the order of the modulus,
1024 bits. Thus each signed pair is of 2048 bits and can be printed as two adjacent QR codes in a piece of paper. Short
group signatures with approximately the same size as RSA signatures can be created efficiently [Boneh et al., 2004, Diaz
et al., 2015]. ridi is also of 1024 bits and can be printed in a QR code. ui mod m is a small integer that needs to be
printed in clear text. ridi and ui need to be printed on the same paper that needs to be destroyed before the voter leaves
the polling booth.
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The EVM needs to print out (Cvi , µvik) for the voter, which, likewise, is 2048 bit in a QR code. On the same paper
the EVM also needs to print (Pi, µPik) in another 2048 bit QR code with w
′
i, a small integer, printed in clear text.
The EVM also needs to print (ridi, vi) in VVPAT. ridi is a 1024 bit integer, which can be printed in a QR code. vi is
a small integer that need to be printed in clear text in the same VVPAT slip.
After polling is over, computation of the global hashHk of EVMk (Figure 6) requiresO(Nk) group operations, where
Nk is the size of the electorate at a polling booth (typically Nk < 2000), amounting to O(Nk log2 p) bit operations. Each
hash Hk is an element of the group, requiring O(log p) space.
The data collection stage of the protocol (Figure 7) requires collectingO(K) hashes, whereK is the number of polling
booths per constituency (typically K ≈ 500). The size of BB1 is therefore O(K log p). Finally, randomizing the records
requires computing a random permutation of N indices, where N = |Φ| is the size of the electorate per constituency
(typically N < 106).
The sizes of BB2 and BB3 (Figure 8) areO(N log p), and checking
⊕
kHk =
⊕
i hi requiresO(N) XOR operations,
amounting to O(N log2 p) bit operations.
Finally, the ZKP of set-membership (Section ??) requires a one-time computation and communication of O(N)
Boneh-Boyen signatures per verifier. Computation of a Boneh-Boyen signature requires O(log2 q) operations for calcu-
lating 1/(x+ i) in a group of order q, and O(log q log2 p) operations for the exponentiation. Thus, it imposes a one-time
cost of O(N log q log2 p + N log2 q) bit operations per verifier per constituency. Given a particular voter’s commitment
Ci though, the set membership protocol requires a constant number of bilinear map evaluations, and a constant number
of exponentiations. Verifying the correctness of a commitment also requires a constant number of exponentiations and a
group operation.
We do not attempt to provide complexity bounds for evaluating bilinear maps as it depends on various domain param-
eters of the elliptic curve and the bilinear pairing selected. Rather, we provide empirical results on the time required to
evaluate these bilinear maps for the particular curve we selected.
We use the PBC library [Lynn, 2013] for estimating the time required for Pedersen commitments and evaluating the
bilinear maps - the two most crucial primitives in our protocol. We choose the Type a1 elliptic curve that is provided by
PBC with log p = 1024, log q = 160 and an embedding size of 2. Using this curve, the time required to generate the
group generators g and h were 6.7 ms on the average; a Pedersen commitment took 28 ms on average and a bilinear map
evaluation took 22 ms on average on commodity hardware, thereby confirming the practicality of our protocol under a
reasonable security guarantee.
Of course, the above estimates are only indicative. For a practical implementation an elliptic curve of sufficient
security strength will have to be chosen more thoughtfully.
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